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With the liberalization of world trade, conventional trading instruments, such as 
tariff, subsidy, etc., have to be governed by GATT/WTO rules, governments of more 
and more countries have to turn to seek for other instruments to shift rent. Under the 
strategic trade motives, many countries took advantage of environmental policy 
(including emission standards, emission taxes, subsidies abatement, clean technology 
and product R&D subsidies, etc.) to perform the functions of strategic trade policy, 
which is to help domestic firms grab excess profits in the international market 
competition, and thus may cause “environmental dumping” phenomenon. 
Most of the literature implicitly established a prerequisite that market capacity of 
some product remained unchanged in the course of the game. In other words, under 
this assumption, the market capacity does not change with the cumulative sales, 
technological development. In fact, market capacity is not fixed during each stage of 
the game. In this thesis, the author conducts a duopoly game model with complete 
information to discuss strategic environmental trade policy issues with the assumption 
that “market capacity is variable”. 
The thesis has five main chapters: Chapter 1 describes the theoretical basis and 
practical background of strategic environmental policy. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature of strategic environmental policy, summarizes 
three classic models and major expansion of the models and gives a brief comment 
about existing research and empirical analysis. 
Chapter 3 is based on Barrett (1994) model using emission standards as 
environmental policy instruments and assumes that market capacity is variable. Using 
this model, the author discusses whether the Government has motive to act 
strategically, and whether this behavior causes environmental dumping; and discusses 
















Chapter 4 gives further expansion of the above model, and considers firm’s 
strategic behavior of R&D investment, and assuming that R & D investment changes 
market capacity. This model proved that the government has the motivation to take 
the bilateral strategic optimal emission standards, and the strategic environmental 
policy still has “environmental dumping” motivation. 
After the theoretical models in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the author uses matlab, 
assigning reasonable parameters of model to analyze “trade effect” and 
“environmental effect” of strategic trade policy environment. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the main conclusions and proposes policy implications for 
China. Finally, the author puts forward ideas for further research. 
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第 1 章  导论 
1 
第 1 章  导论 
1.1 选题的背景及意义 
1.1.1 战略性环境贸易政策的产生 
20 世纪 90 年代，世界经济伴随着三个重大事件开始逐步走向贸易自由化。
第一个事件是美国、加拿大和墨西哥三国在 1992 年 12 月 17 日签署《北美自由
贸易协议》 NAFTA，成为建立在垂直型国际分工基础上的南北合作的新尝试；
第二个事件是于 1993 年 1 月 1 日起，欧共体内部大市场正式运行，商品、资本、


























































Optimal Environment Policy，SOS）和环境最优环境政策（Environmental Optimal 
Policy，EOS）。环境最优政策使得边际政策收益恰好弥补污染的边际环境损害，
而战略最优环境政策并不是以一国环境最优化为目的而制定的。研究表明，由于
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